One integrated company: a single RIA advises both the wealth accounts and the SPVs, with Sean as CIO across both. Founders own a HoldCo/ManagementCo that holds the registered adviser (one Form ADV, one CCO) advising both separate accounts and the SPVs/funds, plus a MediaCo/MarketplaceCo held outside the adviser. Because it is one adviser, Sean is the single investment brain across wealth and deals, so the second senior investment seat is deferred entirely — this is the leanest team and the lowest capital requirement (~$2–4M seed), and the fastest path to proof. The cost is a hybrid the market discounts: a blended raise where the SPV's lumpiness muddies the RIA's clean recurring revenue, and the lowest exit flexibility, because RIA aggregators do not want the SPV's contingent securities liabilities bolted on. It is the right answer when capital is tight, Sean's judgment on the deal side is essential, and speed-to-proof matters more than exit optionality.
Substance drawn from Creator-Platform-RIA-SPV-Architecture-6.30.26.md, Path A (Combined). Axis and score terms below are defined on the methodology page; every characterization is counsel-gated.
Detailed summary
Architecture
Founders own HoldCo / ManagementCo (brand, team, IP), which owns:
- The Registered Investment Adviser — one Form ADV, one CCO, Sean as CIO across both engines — which advises both separate accounts for wealth clients (advisory fee on AUM) and the SPVs and funds (3(c)(1) / 3(c)(7); deal-by-deal and thematic; carry flows to GP entities).
- MediaCo / MarketplaceCo — creator media, events, affiliate revenue — held outside the adviser.
The funnel (an SPV participant becomes a wealth client) is an internal data flow inside one entity. One cap table, possibly with different equity classes. This is not "combined but no deals" — the deal engine is present; what makes it Combined is that a single adviser runs both sides and Sean sits on both.
Team shape
Leanest of the deal-carrying structures. Sean covers investment for both engines, so the second senior investment hire (the SPV-side investment principal / heavyweight IC chair) is deferred entirely — this single seat is the biggest team-cost difference between Combined and Separated. Add a fractional CCO from day one (the RIA-plus-SPV conflict needs compliance ownership independent of the people on both sides of the allocation — Sean cannot be CIO, adviser to the SPVs, and the CCO who polices the conflict), one deal-operations owner for the SPV lifecycle, wealth advisors/IARs as AUM grows, and Edgar-model specialist sourcers as variable cost. Everyone is an employee or principal of one company.
Capital
Lowest of the deal-carrying paths. One registration (state RIA below the threshold, SEC above), one compliance build, one tech build serving both engines, one G&A line, and no duplicate investment principal. Order of magnitude for the seed:
The band covers registration, the fractional CCO, principal comp, the first advisor, the tech build, D&O/E&O, and securities counsel. A single 24-month runway funds one company.
Fundraising
One round into the HoldCo. Investors buy the whole flywheel: a creator-fed wealth platform with a proprietary alternatives engine. Simpler process, one negotiation, one cap table. The cost is a blended-valuation problem — you are asking an investor to underwrite a hybrid that is part recurring-revenue wealth platform (high multiple, clean comps) and part deal sponsor (lumpy carry, lower multiple, more risk surface). The RIA's clean recurring revenue gets muddied by the SPV's lumpiness, and most investors comp to the messier half. You can fight this by making the RIA the narrative and the SPV the acquisition channel, but you are still selling one blended instrument.
Valuation
Valued as one blended entity, most likely on a revenue multiple weighted toward the recurring AUM line but discounted for the SPV complexity and securities-liability surface. A strategic acquirer who wants the integrated flywheel might pay up; a financial buyer will discount the blend. This is the mirror of Separated, where the market pays the full clean RIA multiple (~2–4% of AUM, 6–12x EBITDA) precisely because it is not muddied by the SPV.
Operating flexibility
Simplest to run day-to-day (one company, one compliance program, one set of books). Least flexible to tune: one cap table means every advisor hire dilutes the creator economics and vice versa, one regulatory regime applies to both engines, and the conflict is at its most concentrated because the same person (Sean) sits on both sides of the allocation. Conflict management — disclosure, an independent CCO, a written allocation policy, fee offset so clients are not double-charged — is heavy and constant.
Exit flexibility
Lowest. To sell, a buyer takes the whole thing, and RIA aggregators — the deepest, most liquid buyer pool — do not want the SPV's contingent securities liabilities bolted on. You can carve the RIA out and sell it later, but that becomes a project done under time pressure with a buyer already at the table. Building the entity carve-ready from day one (separable books, separate cap-table pools, the funnel and brand papered as conveyable HoldCo assets) is the hedge the synthesis recommends.
Assessment
Fastest and cheapest to launch, leanest on senior headcount, hardest to value cleanly, and hardest to exit. Combined is the right answer if capital is tight, Sean's judgment on the deal side is essential, and speed-to-proof matters more than exit optionality. Early on, SPV deal cadence is low and does not justify a second senior investment principal, so Sean covering both engines is the capital-efficient choice, and at low volume the affiliated-allocation conflict is small and handled by disclosure plus a fractional CCO.
The synthesis in the memo is not a permanent pick but a sequence: start Combined (or the umbrella variant), build carve-ready, and move to true Separation at the scale event — when deal volume can fund its own investment principal, when a clean RIA sale or dedicated RIA raise becomes a real near-term goal, and when the affiliated-allocation conflict at higher volume makes a dedicated, RIA-only Sean cleaner anyway. Sean-across-both is an early-stage efficiency deliberately traded for clean separation later. At a memo score of 58, Combined sits essentially level with Separated (57): the two are near-ties on the composite because each pays for its strengths with the other's weaknesses. The higher-scoring structures on the master board — the third-party placement agent (64) and the platform-enterprise-equity / co-GP tier (64) — earn their edge by routing capital-side comp through a registered channel or by scaling creator ownership, at the cost of more machinery than a seed-stage Combined build should carry. Affiliated BD/CAB scores 60 and co-GP 58; the two newly identified structures (regulated-retail wrapper and SMA-only) carry no memo score and are graded qualitatively.
Compensation mechanisms under this structure
Which of the fourteen creator-comp mechanisms this entity structure enables versus blocks. Combined is one adviser + MediaCo, with no affiliated broker-dealer/CAB, no separate deal-sponsor entity, and no third-party placement agent — so everything routing through the advisory side, platform equity, and the media P&L is available, while every registered-broker/carry path is off the menu. The binding rule survives: never pay a creator on capital raised. Each links to its mechanism page; scores are the ranked-matrix weighted totals.
The recommended package under Combined
Availability is a structural fact; this is the package a creator is actually paid on. Combined is the reference case — the full two-tier model, and why it barely moves across structures, lives on the Incentive design page.
Available under Combined
Blocked under Combined
These require machinery Combined does not stand up — a registered broker-dealer channel, a separate deal-sponsor GP with genuine GP work, or the prohibited pattern itself.